What does “more suffering than happiness” means?

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In Magnus Vinding‘s [1] words [2]:

I think there is a problem with underspecified [in expressions] like “more suffering than happiness” […] For example, talking about “whether suffering or enjoyment is more common” (in this piece [3]) sounds rather descriptive, whereas saying that, or whether, “suffering predominates” (ibid.) will often have evaluative and/or moral connotations. The same is true of a term like welfare: it often has an evaluative/axiological meaning as opposed to a purely descriptive one (see e.g. sec. 1.1.1 here: https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92027/3/Mathison_Eric_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf [4]).

Indeed, the question as to “whether suffering predominates” can mean at least three very different things […]

For one, it may refer to a purely descriptive statement: there is a greater quantity of happiness than suffering, by some given measure. (And this, in turn, implies further questions concerning how one indeed measures happiness and suffering, in particular how one measures them against each other, and whether they are even commensurable, not just evaluatively but also in purely descriptive terms, cf. https://foundational-research.org/measuring-happiness-and-suffering/ [5] and https://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/vol1/iss7/18/ [6])

Second, it may mean something along evaluative lines such as “there is more positive value than negative value” in the existing happiness and suffering respectively. And this is a very different claim in that one can claim there is far more happiness than suffering in the world, by some given measure, yet still maintain that the disvalue of the suffering is far greater than the value of the happiness. Indeed, quite a number of philosophers and traditions in the East (cf. http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2015/12/Breyer-Axiology-final.pdf [7]) and the West (including Epicurus and Schopenhauer) have defended views according to which the disvalue of suffering dominates that of happiness entirely; for recent defenses of such views, see Gloor: https://foundational-research.org/tranquilism/ [8] and Wolf: https://jwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/Papers/JUPE.HTM [9].

Third, one can think there is far more happiness than suffering in the world, even in evaluative terms, yet still think the suffering carries much greater moral/deontic significance; asymmetries of this kind have in fact been defended by quite a few prominent philosophers, including W. D Ross, cf. sec. 2.5 here: https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92027/3/Mathison_Eric_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf [10]

Beyond that, there are also issues concerning intra and inter-personal trade-offs: even if most lives in nature contain far more happiness than suffering (by some assumed measure), this would not mean that the happiness of some beings can ever outweigh the suffering of others, either in evaluative terms or deontic terms. Many ethicists accept intra-personal trade-offs while rejecting inter-personal ones (for instance Richard Ryder and Stevan Harnad, and to some extent Jamie Mayerfeld).

The perhaps most important question to ponder deeply, in my view, is whether we think any amount of happiness can morally outweigh the very worst of suffering. I have argued in the negative: https://magnusvinding.com/2018/09/03/the-principle-of-sympathy-for-intense-suffering/ [11] and so have philosophers Jamie Mayerfeld, Joseph Mendola, Ingemar Hedenius, and Ragnar Ohlsson, among others.

Just thought this was worth pointing out. Notions of “net negative” and “net positive” lives — as pertaining both to single individuals and (especially) to groups — require serious unpacking in terms of their meaning and assumed evaluative and moral implications.

 

Links and references

[1] https://magnusvinding.com/

[2] https://www.facebook.com/groups/suffering.in.nature/permalink/2727855270577587/

[3] http://www.zachgroff.com/2019/06/how-much-do-wild-animals-suffer.html

[4] https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92027/3/Mathison_Eric_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf

[5] https://foundational-research.org/measuring-happiness-and-suffering/

[6] https://animalstudiesrepository.org/animsent/vol1/iss7/18/

[7] http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/files/2015/12/Breyer-Axiology-final.pdf

[8] https://foundational-research.org/tranquilism/

[9] https://jwcwolf.public.iastate.edu/Papers/JUPE.HTM

[10] https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/92027/3/Mathison_Eric_201811_PhD_thesis.pdf

[11] https://magnusvinding.com/2018/09/03/the-principle-of-sympathy-for-intense-suffering/

Types of suffering based on their uncertainty

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The following is a list of types of suffering organized according to their uncertainty.

1. Suffering well reported.

In this case, the suffering being is typically an adult human who survives to the negative experience and can describe it.

  • Large burned; suffering by fires, plane crashes, explosions, bombings… (suffering by hot)
  • Individuals suffering cold and freezing.
  • Experimentation with human beings.
  • Partial drowning.
  • Physical torture.
  • Psychological torture.
  • Rape in adults.
  • Irukandji jellyfish sting.
  • Cluster headache.
  • Trigeminal neuralgia.
  • Conscious agony without palliative care (cancer, degenerative diseases…)
  • Heart attacks and cardiovascular accidents.
  • Depression.
  • Psychological suffering due to the loss of a loved one.
  • Psychological suffering of abandonment and separation type (emotional break in couples or between parents and children)
  • Psychological suffering due to feeling guilty for having caused or not having been able to avoid the damage to a loved one.
  • Another psychological suffering.
  • Birth pain.

2. Suffering difficult to survey.

It is the case of suffering in non-human animals, very young humans, humans in oppressive situations, humans with some cognitive impairment, and humans who do not survive the experience of suffering, or for any other reason they cannot communicate it.

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The science of consciousness and the science of suffering

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Most of us are primarily interested in the problem of suffering, and secondarily in the question of consciousness. Because suffering is a phenomenal phenomenon we need to know what is consciousness. This seems to be important in how we approach the question of consciousness here.

Currently, the science of consciousness and the science of suffering are still in a pre-natal stage, the former being almost born, the latter just conceived. We cannot ‘define’ what we don’t know yet, but we may begin a scientific approach with working definitions.

It seems clear to me that consciousness and suffering are in another category than a table, a mountain or baldness. Life is a better comparison, but not adequate yet. To get good working definitions, I suggest that we consider that consciousness and suffering are phenomena in two senses:

– an object or aspect known through the senses rather than by thought or intuition (consciousness and suffering are known like that, by an “immediate sense”, unlike the “categories” of table, mountain, baldness or life)

– a fact or event of scientific interest susceptible to scientific description and explanation (consciousness, suffering and life are like that, but not a table, a mountain, or baldness)

— Robert Daoust

A quick summary on Sentient Platonism

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Sentience Platonism is the idea that experiences exist by themselves, regardless of the sentient beings who experience them. How is that possible? Our minds could be like radio receivers capable of connecting some “station”. The mind, as the radio-receiver, does not generate anything new, but connects to something that preexists.

Is it compatible with emergentism? No, it’s just the opposite. The “radio receivers” metaphor is a type of immersionism (the symmetrical hypothesis of emergentism). Is it compatible with the simulation hypothesis? Yes. Sentience Platonism can be reinforced by the idea that perhaps we live in a simulation and beings may be “instantiated” from an ideal object, in the same way as “instances” of software objects in “Object-Oriented Programming“.

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Implications of a plausible Sentience Platonism in the prevention of suffering

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Even if the probability of Sentience Platonism were extremely small, while there is a higher than zero probability, and considering that is not very clear where sentience comes from, we might think twice before disregarding this idea, because should it be true, its implications for preventing suffering would be immense.

In Sentience Platonism we can consider at least three possibilities. In all three cases I am going to talk about a platonic experience that generates in some way several conventional experiences and I will analyze, assuming that this hypothesis was true, what would be its consequences in terms of relief and prevention of suffering.

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Monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism and beyond

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“Monistic theories (monism) defend a single type of substance that composes reality (for example, matter -materialism-. Others instead claim that the spirit or psyche -panpsychism-).

Dualistic theories (dualism) defend two types of substances (for example, body and mind) or two worlds (earth and sky).

Trialist theories (trialism) defend the existence of three types of substances or three types of realities. The graphic presented here resonates with the doctrine of the three worlds of Karl Popper. In it, Popper divides the world into three categories:

  • World 1: Physical. The world of objects, not only visible, also things that escape the human eye. It is the world of physical objects.
  • World 2: Experience / Feeling. The world of mental processes, conscious or unconscious. It is the place where feelings of pain, pleasure and thought occur. It is the world of subjective experiences.
  • World 3: Ideas / Knowledge. It is the world where objective knowledge is found.

In his book “In search of a better world”, in the first of his articles (“Knowledge and configuration of reality”), Popper speaks of three worlds. World 1, the material; world 2, that of experience, and world 3, that of the products of the human mind; and indicates that it seems clear that world 1 is the creator of world 2.

In a way trialism could be considered a level of complexity sufficient to represent all theories, but from other approaches, it may not be enough, and we have to go to a quadrialism (adding identity as a fourth element) and even go further. A complete simulation environment must support monism, dualism, trialism, quadrialism, etc.”

Source: What are the different types of elements that constitute reality in its most essential aspect?

The metaphysics of the end of suffering

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Things do not fall down, but are attracted to the center of planet Earth, this being a model that can be complicated including other celestial bodies. The difference is not important at the local level, but it is fundamental to understand it if our plan includes escaping from the planet. In the same way, knowing what sentience really is (Open Individualism, Empty Individualism) does not seem very important if this in practice manifests itself in other ways (Closed Individualism), but in a project that pretends to escape from all suffering it is absolutely essential. Of course, this may sound as far-fetched and ambitious as escaping the gravity of planet Earth. A few centuries ago no one in his right mind would have proposed something like that, or if he had, he would have been ridiculed as a pretentious madman.

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Consciousness and the binding-problem

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While panpsychism sounds crazy, it is actually a highly viable theory of consciousness, as long as it is distinguished from animism: the view that everything is alive and therefore possesses agency, intentionality, thoughts, emotions, etc. Elementary particles almost certainly are not endowed any of these attributes, but according to (my take on) panpsychism, they have a very fundamental kind of consciousness, perhaps something akin to the feeling of presence or “being there.” —Kenneth Shinozuka

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Simulating philosophical hypotheses about sentience

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Simulations can be used to understand and evaluate the different theories and metaphysical hypotheses in relation to sentience. We can use simulations as educational tools to better understanding of the different hypotheses, theories, paradigms and worldviews on sentience, as well as their implications, providing clarity in the debate about the details and alternatives within each of the theories. Also, simulations can help in the search of good arguments to assess the plausibility of the different theories, so that we can have better criteria to allocate more or less resources to investigate or take into account one or the other within a plan to reduce future suffering.

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Empty, Open and Closed Individualism

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…it is common to access some memory of adolescence and to be ashamed of oneself, of what we did or even of what we thought at that moment. It seems as if someone else has done it. It can become humiliating or almost inconceivable that we would have been able to think or do such a thing. But this is explained simply if we accept that we are precisely talking about another person: my “I of the past”. Every millisecond (or minimum unit of time) we are a different person. This is called Empty Individualism.

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