The Interface Theory of Perception by Donald D. Hoffman

A goal of perception is to estimate true properties of the world. A goal of categorization is to classify its structure. Aeons of evolution have shaped our senses to this end. These three assumptions motivate much work on human perception. I here argue, on evolutionary grounds, that all three are false. Instead, our perceptions constitute a species-specific user interface
that guides behavior in a niche. Just as the icons of a PC’s interface hide the complexity of the computer, so our perceptions usefully hide the complexity of the world, and guide adaptive behavior. This interface theory of perception offers a framework, motivated by evolution, to guide research in object categorization. This framework informs a new class of evolutionary
games, called interface games, in which pithy perceptions often drive true perceptions to extinction…

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Proto-Intelligence in Qualia: a Simple Case

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Do qualia like love, fear, pain, and pleasure causally influence us? I think that the evolutionary argument that qualia must influence us is sufficiently clear and easy to understand that there should be very little room for disagreement on the matter. Evolution wouldn’t have built phenomenal world-simulations composed of qualia unless they increased our inclusive fitness in some way, because an increase in fitness is a logically necessary condition for evolution to select traits of any kind.

>> … Why does pain repel? Not for any mechanical reason, but instead because the raw feel of pain is intrinsically and irreducibly negative, and we (as receptive qualia systems) thus seek to avoid it.

>> …
Consider the phenomenon of intense love. It’s a trope that love changes the raw qualitative feel of the world, oneself, music, one’s beloved, and a broad range of other things. Love is very selective in the things that it preserves and in the things that it changes. It wouldn’t change the physical orientation of buildings, their color, or their form, because all of these things have survival utility, and the utility function of love doesn’t seek its own extinction. Instead, love acts selectively on the aesthetic qualities that interpenetrate gestalts, such as cities, one’s self-model, one’s beloved, and music

Read more:
https://autonoetic.blogspot.com/2022/12/proto-intelligence-in-qualia-simple-case.html

A comprehensive list of ways in which reality may be distorted by perception, by David Pearce

“If the doors of perception were cleansed every thing would appear to man as it is, Infinite.”  —William Blake

1. You don’t perceive the environment. There is no public world. Instead, your local environment partially selects your brain states, some of which are experienced as your external surroundings. Mind-independent reality is a speculative metaphysical inference, sadly a strong one, IMO. Contra William Blake (and Aldous Huxley), there are no see-though doors of perception in need of a good wash, just cranial prisons.

2. Whether you are awake or dreaming, your world-simulation is populated by zombies. When you are awake, these zombies are the avatars of sentient beings, but the imposters loom larger than their hypothetical real-world counterparts.

3. Your egocentric world-simulation resembles a grotesque cartoon. Within the cartoon, you are the hub of reality, the most important being in the universe…

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Physicalism Implies Experience Never Dies, by Vitrify her

Full text:

The inner light of awareness never dies. At least that is the case if you take physicalism seriously. We would actually need to invoke a dualist mysterianism or the supernatural in order to defend the idea that we die.

Yes, you read that right. A clear-headed assessment of current physics tells us that we are in for a hell of a ride. We will ride across the crests and troughs of intelligence levels, hedonic valences, and transmute our minds into witnesses of all manner of depravities possible at shifting velocities of perception. Memories will vanish, personal identities will vanish, molecular configurations will vanish. Consciousness never simply vanishes.

Bad news if you are currently an anti-natalist, efilist or anything of the sort. Great news if you love life, albeit not enough to pay for cryonics.

Seriously, what I have compiled here is the most important thing you will probably ever read. This is not to say I am the only name who has discovered this unsettling fact. Other names have independently discovered this as I did, but none have been very loud about it.

Relativity implies a block universe in which there is no universal now sweeping forward.

First, let’s get our picture of reality right.

You might have heard that everything we see and feel and hear is happening in an inner simulation produced by certain brain processes. And that this is the alternative view to believing that we are invisible ghosts behind the eyes of the real body. Neuroscientists claim that contrary to being invisible ghosts behind physical bodies, we are simulations inside of brains, to the lack of consternation of non-neuroscientists who do not think of their bodies as existing inside brain simulations.

brainmap_Homunculus

However, the attempt to find patterns of brain neurons firing that equal specific emotions is flawed because there are no specific, cut-out slices of emotions, moods, or other perceptions.

It must also be pointed out that the heart and stomach have the same kinds of neurons as the brain.

If we attempt to predict conscious perceptions by pointing to “electromagnetic fields” instead of “neuronal computations,” then it is noteworthy to consider that the heart emits fields thousands of times stronger than the brain.

It can be said that the neuroscientific paradigm is partially a scam by the signaler of intelligence. It points to the realm of abstraction in order to distance itself from the realm of the body, where it doesn’t have a comparative advantage. Although this move isn’t inherently wrong from the rational teleologic perspective, and derives much benefit for some time, it can lead to what Nassim Taleb calls fragility, or, to use what I consider a more condescending expression, confusion.

The brain, like all other partitions of reality, were invented.

The “riding around inside a brain-simulation” hypothesis is irreparably wrong in principle as a final explanation. There is only one generalizable principle that works with 100% accuracy, and that is that nothing has persistent identity. Sunyatta is the universal prior in Bayes’ Theorem. A “brain” doesn’t have a persistent identity. It isn’t a unitary object that knows to be separate from other “brains” that exist in time-like and space-like separation from it.

The alternative would be that a brain knows to be a brain; that a table knows to be a table; that a chariot knows to be a chariot.

There are ways to undo this mistake of believing in unitary objects that are “self-contained” in the same way that “my consciousness is self-contained.” First, we can notice that everything, without exception, changes. To say it in a more fancy way: everything is laid out on entropy gradients. Imagine many subcomponents out of which things are composed. These “points” are then all in “different places” in spacetime.

Second, we can notice that the attempt to define the existence of a thing requires using more things that are not themselves well-defined. However, we forget this fundamental undefinability. So the noticing has to be reinforced with slightly ambiguous language in order to be memorable, so we say this: Pointers point to pointers which point to pointers. Fractal people make more sense than atheist people. No people makes even more sense.

Taken together, these two considerations suggest we should not be naive realists. Naive realists trust their immediate intuition as being the generalizable and permanent truth. In other words, they trust their immediate impressions as evidence of the real structure undercurrent to us.

Generalizable and permanent. There are no discernible alternatives to what we mean by truth.

We believe there is a structure external to us composed of the generalizable and permanent – what we call physical laws. We must trust laws which yield predictions and explanations for phenomena, even if these laws and theories require a scaffolding far removed in number of logical inferential steps from the obvious direct sense impressions. If you do not believe that acceleration due to gravity here on Earth is 9.8 m/s² due to having the sense impression that you are all-powerful, then you jump out of a window expecting to levitate.

If we are rationalists who believe in the empirical precedence of Occam’s Razor, then there is some empirical sense in which discrete-like events of “jump out of the window” can be imagined. But these imagined-discrete “histories” are not remembered.

It is physically impossible to find yourself where you don’t exist so that’s why these histories in the universal wavefunction are not remembered.

That is because the observer is entangled with the observation. But there is too much mysticism-noise surrounding quantum mechanics dialogue, so let’s use the other tried and tested pillar of physical reality: relativity.

Relativity, like quantum mechanics, also has testable implications. These include time dilation, which can be observed by placing an atomic clock on a supersonic jet and leaving another one on the crust of the Earth. The one that went on the trip around the Earth will be younger than the one that was allowed to rest on a less speedy frame once they meet again. This means that the fast, younger one, extracted information about reality – that there wasn’t a single time and place where things occurred.

The sets of points assumed to constitute existence do not exist in a single frame of reference. Points can even be human bodies assumed to have persistent identities.

There is sometimes identification with the human bodies assumed to have permanence. “We” often refers to bodies. But “We” are never existing in the same physical time. There is no universally common reference frame

Causal connection that leads to agreement on the same past is the shared belief in the speed of light as a limit. If “a body” moves very fast relative to “another body” that it will never be causally connected with in some faraway region of the universe, such as another Hubble Volume, then relativity predicts that the other body will not become a part of the same shared past. There is, to an arbitrary degree of physical certainty, no agreement on a logical order to events.

We imagine that physically, there are many heres, all equally real, never deleted. Experientially, there is only this here, forever. And this is provable even in the most circular fashion, by believing in the static physical points.

According to Einstein’s special theory of relativity, it is impossible to say in an absolute sense that two distinct events occur at the same time and in the same place. All events are necessarily separated in spacetime. Without separation, they could not be considered distinct events in spacetime to be joined by using the speed of light.

In the absence of relative distances in spacetime, there would be nothing to be joined, and therefore no use to the concept of light or causal propagation.

What is an event? An event is a point in a frame of reference. The frame of reference has no intrinsic meaning except when defined with relation to another chosen frame of reference moving in relation to it.

One can assign coordinates to the event: three spatial coordinates {\displaystyle {\vec {x}}=(x,y,z)} to describe the location and one time coordinate t to specify the moment at which the event occurs. Like with all other metaphors, this is necessarily incomplete in its simplicity. The event can be as close or as far away as you like from “a freckle on your nose,” “a synapse firing in your brain,” or “the entire body sitting on the chair.”

However, it must be made very clear that relativity is not fiction, even though the coordinates are simplifications of what turned out to be, at bottom, a quantum mechanical reality. For the GPS on your phone to guide you to your destination, wether that be a restaurant, or a beach, or an ice cream shop, the phone has to be synced with a satellite in space that exists in a measurably different time due to being farther away from the center of the Earth.

The relative time syncing is not invented by humans like the delta in time that has to be accounted for from Pacific Time Zone to Eastern Time Zone. The time syncing needs to be accounted for because Einstein was not making up all this stuff about relative reference frames. The satellite is physically older than the reference frame at your footstep. The iron in your blood is ticking slower than its magnetometers.

This model accurately describes the physical, even though it is constructed with model items such as these idealized coordinates. It doesn’t just work by accident, it works because Einstein and Lorentz and Poincare and Minkowski really uncovered something real… Yes, by making stuff up, it is possible to imagine something which actually turns out to be true as evidenced by repeated predicted observation, and by explanatory strength.

So none of that crap about “theories are man-made, feeble, subject to change the next decade, whimsical fictions… that happen to mysteriously work.” Theories may still need further work to complete them, but once you lift a part of the skirt of reality, you cannot unsee it. Newtonian mechanics is still adhering to its covenant, (Or at least for long enough that Musk’s rockets may make it to Mars I suppose.) The truth is in what it points to, not in the tool or the formalism as it stands.

Here is the single most important visual that will ever be presented to you in human form:

Relativity_of_Simultaneity_Animation

The white line plays out three times. It represents the order of events for three different observers motion.

In an ideal world, you would witness this gif, and at once collapse of shock, seeing that because they physically disagree, and they are all physically real in the absence of solipsism – all your past is inscribed in eternity, occurring as ceaselessly as your future.

If even after my explanation, you don’t get why this is true read this:

Special RelativityRelativity of SimultaneityB-Theory of TimeRietdijk-Putnam argument

The points, whatever you want to make them: “conscious moments,” “alien head,” “frozen waterfall,” “mother,” “infinitesimal black dot,” that exist in some relative past are as present as your present. All is factored into the present by virtue of the fact that reference frames not containing your present form nonetheless exist in relative motion to what you imagine as your past and future forms. That’s because nothing in reality is deleted by a Newtonian clock sweeping forward or deleting the cache.

As we have seen before with Sunyatta as the universal prior, we continue to dissolve the notion that there is a fundamental object in nature which is a well-defined moment.

A well-defined snapshot is impossible. And I highly suspect that the reason why reality is not composed of discrete snapshots that are well defined in the sense that they have clear boundaries and permanence is for the same reason that pictures are losing market value in the age of Instagram. Taking many pictures reduces their intrinsic value.

The mistake being made is that people view themselves fundamentally as people, as organisms with a finite lifespan. Even most materialists that convincingly exist around me and that I can convincingly affect by redesigning their language, believe that they somehow began existing at conception – their soul a brain. However, there is no special relation between the snapshot of “your” brain when you blew the candles on “your” tenth birthday and the snapshot of “your” brain as you see the period at the end of this sentence. The “your” in “your brain” is a convenient fiction. And somewhat annoyingly we use it too much in “our” language. As I recall from cultural anthropology, there is a group of Native Americans which has no word for individual ownership. There is also an Amazonian tribe that points behind their heads towards the future, and point forward towards the past. There is a Northern Namibian tribe that points towards the green as if it were indistinguishable from le bleu.

Ontologically, this present moment is dissimilar to “your” ten-year-old self moment in the exact same way that “my” present moment is dissimilar to it. No orbs of awareness exist parallel to each other in a vacuum and have an equal force vector applied to them that pushes them forward in time.

Imagine the contrary position, that there was a linear sequence of events that belonged to a particular bounded soul. Now reduce the delta between observations to attain enlightenment. In other words, notice that you can shorten the timespan as much as you like between the past memory and now, and the past memory will always be not you. If you know calculus, you will recognize this as taking the limit as Δt approaches 0; so the consciousness function with Δt in the denominator = ∞. There is consciousness, in all its varieties, in all times and places, wherever such data is represented and self-analyzed. There is no extra “my consciousness” being carried by some fundamental object in nature called “my brain.”

Longinus is the same as the Christ every time he pierces his ribs. The murderer and the murdered are one. Infinitely separate and yet infinitely close.

Reductionists know this. Or should. Physicalists know this. Or should. It is the “science as attire” people, the “majority” of people, from who I do not expect this conclusion to have sprouted, since the ground of “all is physics” doesn’t compose the soil of their mind.

    n = any positive integer
    i = 0whilei <= n:
        i = i + 1

People imagine that life is like this Python code. Eventually i is greater than n and the code terminates. There is some point in the future along one’s timeline at which fate catches up and one inevitably seizes to continue on. We are each our own machine running this snippet of code with a different value for n and hence we terminate at different times as different fundamental entities.

Even though Carl Sagan advocated this common sense view inherited from the un-inspected intuitions left in the vacuum of Christianity. And I’m sure most scientists, secularists, and self-identified materialists also believe this (watch anything the popularizers of “science” say to the similarly physics-ignorant masses on the subject of death, eg. deGrasse Tyson, Dawkins, Krauss), not realizing that they have forgone the use of Occam’s razor on the yet cherished bosom of their ideological mother.

The common-sense atheist view of death is forgivable when you are repping for Materialistic Atheism in 4th century India as a Charvaka rebelling against less believable Vedic creeds.

There is no other world other than this;
There is no heaven and no hell;
The realm of Shiva and like regions,
are fabricated by stupid imposters.

— Sarvasiddhanta Samgraha, Verse 8

It is truly the case that there is no universe other than this if we define the universe as the multiverse on all levels on which one may be compelled to invoke the title of  multiverse (e.g. MWI, embryonic bubbles from inflation, nested simulations, cyclical model etc.) But that fact, that our fates are tied only to mere physical reality, doesn’t imply what these cackling men thought it did. They did not know modern physics. They also did not spend as much time meditating (valuing pleasurable indulgence instead), and so did not stumble into the lines of introspection from which one could reason out empty individualism as the Buddhists did.

It is forgivable when we are ten years old atheists and are genetically set to be brighter (and/or display more individualistic phenotype) than our religious parents but do not yet understand the theory of relativity, and naturally think that what is most believable is what is most rational.

It is not forgivable when… Okay, “forgivable” is too strong of a word. Everything is forgivable. But it is less readily forgivable to have access to Wikipedia, over one hundred years of civilizational repose to digest the discoveries of relativity and Q.M., endless sources that give testament to free reliable information about neuroscience and physics, a goddamn Ph.D in a scientific field, and still not understand that believing the proposition “a classical object brain carries my soul (but I won’t call it a soul)” is tragic.

If you are really following the plot at the physical level, the one who believes in a soul here is not the Dalai Lama but Carl Sagan. While I do not actually know the beliefs of the Dalai Lama and I would expect him to hold more false ones than Sagan, let’s presume he is a good Buddhist and therefore an empty individualist. When Sagan criticizes his belief in rebirth, he is actually not understanding the subtle, accidentally physically-correct view at the core of Buddhism. Perhaps the Lama doesn’t either, as Tibetan Vajrayana is a late sect and it does sound like they are perilously close to talking about the reincarnation of individual streams.

But if you read the Suttas, you will find the Buddha (really the people who wrote the Suttas 400 years later) say this: “There is no one who reincarnates. Think of it like this: There is a single flame on a candle, and from that flame are lit all the other candles. There is no need for another flame, and yet no one travels from one moment to the next. There is no self in the flame.”

So the structure of reality pointed to with this passage is monism. There is just the causal contraption of existence. There is no further ontological existences within the existence (i.e. separate souls with a personal continuity on independent journeys).

Analyzing Carl Sagan’s position, the one that my sciency-wannabe ten-year-old would have rooted for, we find that it is actually proposing such souls. He proposes that there is an object (commonly shorthanded as a brain), with a constancy, unlike all the other ephemeral phenomena of nature, which at some point i shares something very special with an arbitrary i – n and by virtue of this special quality provides a track for his consciousness to travel along. We are supposed to believe that the i – n could even be toddler Sagan when every brain cell is different; yet somehow that special track for his personal consciousness sprouts forth to conduct the Sagan-ness essence in a way that it doesn’t sprout from some differently named toddler that has a proportionally equivalent difference in atomic configuration.

It is up to the one who postulates an ontologically-basic passenger, train track, and pit which obliterates the passenger and the train track to explain what these things are physically and why they have to be fundamental.

It is much more simple and scientifically conservative to say that there is just the evolution of the quantum wave-function in spacetime and all else is ultimately reducible to this. We are called by reason to be reductionists. There is no need to imagine a special link beyond physics which connects people slices who happen to have the same name, and that can surmount configuration changes from one moment to the next.

There are no separate line segments leaving white-space on the page of experienced history. It is more like a Hilbert curve.

maxresdefault

We flow through every possible experience wherever “conscious mind(s)” run their course in the universe. However, when I am your now, I am not this now which is typing. It is true that from the “prison of this computation” erroneously assumed to be a discrete object, due to it never finishing to become closed in on itself, I cannot feel what you feel, and you cannot feel what “this computational solution” feels like.

If you could be identical to it, as opposed to just extracting information about what it is like, then there would be no flow in eternity. The eternity would be static.

But we are the same feeler. There is no fundamental you and I. It is the same wave function; there is only one canvas of the universe on which computations can be painted. The One writes this and The One reads this, reminded that she will go on as The One. Don’t be lonely.

*This is not a linear flow that zig zags through timelines. There are no timelines which correspond to persons. Consciousness doesn’t follow through on conduits built from abstract narratives of self-modeling social apes, it is the self-modeling behavior of the total hierarchy which is consciousness. We can invent new ways of being with our words.

Even if you now grok relativity and irrefutably welded the true geometry of spacetime into your head, it will still feel evidently wrong that we are one. This is because it is also true that we are not one in any expansive sense that can reach beyond the bounds of the sensorium in this now. “Yes Deepak, no matter how much we meditate.” There is the mistaken notion that we could feel everything at once which is equivalent to saying that we could instantly remember what it feels to be everything at once.

If that was possible then there would be stasis, not improvement.

Contrary to popular belief, even Siddhartha Gautama didn’t proclaim that we could open our minds to be one with the cosmic mind. That was within the panacea of Hinduism, which the Buddha defied. He calls this belief, “self-evidently foolish.”

And it is foolish. In order to experience a cosmic mind, we would need to carefully hook up all our circuitry. To mold the asteroids and moons in our image, a la Kurzweil.

It feels separate “from inside” this computation because this computation chooses to define itself separate from “what is outside.” A degree of separation is the only way that a computation can formally exist. All information would mean no information. What makes experiences separate is that they are specified by different intrinsic information.

IIT tried to formalize this. And their formalism is necessarily wrong. Because being can’t be that which it points to. But the general idea is inescapable. There are relative speeds allowing for relative rates of osmosis.

Consciousness can be assigned arbitrary properties, so it is not fundamentally wrong to say “we” are separate, just so long as we remember you and I are no more fundamentally separate than the you from 5 seconds ago is to this very you now (which is tricked into appropriating observer-moments in one organism and not another by the equivalent of spells being cast in the integral of the cortical midline structure.)

In fact, just as you can define a division by 0 as ∞, it is also correct to define it as -∞. “We are all the same,” or “we are all absolutely isolated forever” are actually the same observation.

Tending to speak of unifying oneness, or of isolated flux is a matter of the direction we prefer to approach our limit from.

1600px-Hyperbola_one_over_x.svg

Earlier it was stated that consciousness is a continuous function, and this isn’t quite right. Saying that is an attempt to scavenge some makeshift understanding from the common sense intuitions which might ease a physicalist novice down the path of truth. But if we are trying to form a bridge between our common-sense view of reality and physicalist reality, then a better analogy is to think of consciousness as the vertical asymptote that arises here when dividing by zero.

For the sake of retaining your sanity, keep the notion of continuous timelines for now:

Screen Shot 2018-05-16 at 10.14.11 AM

Each colored line represents a common-sense timeline of a person.

Then physicalism; no tricks, no souls, no magic box for soul emerging at conception called “brain”, no personal simulation on alien VR hardware, etc. does this to your timelines:

Screen Shot 2018-05-16 at 10.23.30 AM

The vertical line is one. And it moves through all timelines. Or all timelines move through it.

This illustration works because it shows that awareness is one, and exists in many places (wherever there is an intersection.)  But it can NEVER directly know it, directly understand it, directly “qualia” it from any such place it finds itself.

The Now which is reading these words is at some intersection, defined as a coordinate point. So the point that is you now is not any other point. It is isolated. It cannot know other points.

Through the vehicle of reason, facilitated through this writing which stimulates thinking deeply about how this is implied by physicalism, we can come to acknowledge reality.

Rarely do we connect our separate fragments as we have a chance of doing now. So my intention to convey understanding is honest. This is not an attempt to hone my Zen jesting skills, and I am not trying to confuse you with ambiguous language that hides imprecisions. It is a matter of technical understanding that open individualism and empty individualism are the same thing once you get past the aesthetic choice of emphasis.

Empty individualism is traditionally said to be very different from open individualism, perhaps even the opposite view. Empty is defined as the view in which the knowers are infinite. Every point slice of now is its own knower. Open is defined as the view in which there is one knower. As I have shown, these are the same view, which can only be made different if we introduce ignorance of physics or pop-psychology confusions.

What is true is not at all intuitive and takes a kind of intellectual yoga to wrap around. So we must check for understanding:

First check. Do I fundamentally understand that spacetime is not some grand single stage holding everyone in it in the same time? If you are still confused about why the people you see are not really there in the same physical stage of now, Review Relativity. If understood by the very bone marrow fashioning the blood of the extra-cranial vessel, move on to the next check.

Second check. Do I really understand why I come out at the other end of sleep and anesthesia?

If you understand that you survive anesthesia even after being shipped to the Carina Nebula and perhaps losing a few neurons, then you understand why the moment after “death” will be one of opening your eyes wherever the next informationally closest version of you is in this infinite universe. Nothing will happen. Consciousness is, in this sense, a continuous function.

In the case of anesthesia, the organism which is fully anesthetized displays the behavior of not producing experiences for that stretch of time in which such capacity is inhibited (an ON-brain becomes an OFF-brain, a raven becomes a stone) but consciousness never experiences non-existence. It just blinks into existence on the other side where there is a similar ON-brain, as if no time had passed in between. Ask anyone who’s had anesthesia. Or don’t. I mean, what else could we expect?

Sleep confuses people because it is a word that we use to hold a set of different phenomena [non-existence, restful very-low awareness, dreaming]. Only the first item is not in the range of the consciousness function. The other two are on the same ramp you are on in waking life and will always be on.

If you have passed the second check, you fundamentally understand why being blasted in the head with a bazooka and having the worms feast on the decapitated corpse means something only from the “story-of-person” perspective but means nothing to you the consciousness which is not the brain but the specific motions of information that understand and feel themselves to be, wherever and whenever they are instantiated. And those motions of information which constitute “this next moment” exist in the bodily motions that experience themselves to be “the survivor.”  …Just like the consciousness appears to survive from the dead third-grader we assume we once were.

It doesn’t matter where in the universe this survivor experience exists. When we sleep, we still awake on the other side even though the Earth has moved your room far along in spacetime on its geodesic motion around the Sun. If it takes a trillion years for some civilization to recreate your “very next” brain pattern, from the perspective of that brain pattern in faraway coordinates, no time will have passed.

Why would anyone resurrect you? It doesn’t matter. In an infinite universe, this is guaranteed to happen because it is consistent with the laws of physics; you are just the informational structure created by the motion of a bunch of matter after all.

The Hogan-ish, or Shermer-ish cynic who is not a rationalist but rather adhering to a perceived brand of skepticism, will recoil at the suggestion that when we read of Emperor Uda, we are actually reading about ourselves (in the sense that matters.) Yet unless the skeptic can overthrow Relativity, (and hence make our GPS system a lie) they cannot deny all “the slices” of Emperor Uda’s life exist, and I can imagine that they all feel themselves to flow in the same way that I flow.

Say they grant this, but still want to preserve a unique soul that corresponds to their name. What’s their next defense? Do they appeal to intuitions from elementary biology textbooks? Probably. They might say:

“But we are different organisms! With separate genetic codes!”

Do better. This is not being reductionist enough. Organisms change from moment to moment, we can sew together brains, split them, dice them into quarts and regroup. In fact, this surgery is being performed on you by entropy whether you consent or not. Entire memories are wholesale discarded, unrecognizable personalities are forged from “new” atoms. If the question “Who is conscious?” feels mysterious to you, and especially so when considering abrupt surgeries, then you really don’t get it.

We are the same ground awareness/being/consciousness/existence. Notions of objects with unchanging identities, notions of the meaningfulness of spatio-temporal distance, notions of “but if we change it very slowly,” all of these must be immolated.

From the burned offering of Newton’s fantasy, we summon our true mother: The multiplex eyes covering her body are entangled into a singular geometry.

When considering your surroundings – from the womb to the temple, you must not hinge from incorrect notions of space and time. There is no fundamentality to these notions here. The mathematical room we are in is not composed of unit-words or of unit-emotions or of unit-anythings. I choose to call it mathematical because cross multiplication is fundamental to neural networks, to probability, to exchange of value.

Remember, here there is no time-lag or space-lag; you awake on the other end of anesthesia without so much as a poof.

120-cell-inner

A causal structure (a computation) never becomes another causal structure. Becoming makes no sense. They are all inter-nested differentially information bound sub-architectures in the same architecture. But like the non-traversable elsewhere regions in a light cone diagram, the contents of each particular flow slice are unbridgeable to the contents of another. The contents cannot be bridgeable. The contents cannot be bridged. A content knows not of another. Else it would not be the content that it is. Get it?

It is never about “who becomes who?” It is always about “where does who stand in the differentially informationally related space?”

Screen Shot 2018-05-21 at 7.29.45 PM

I should have now placed you in a position where you can clearly understand the Classical physics assumptions in Elizabeth’s comment. You can now see clearly the dangling nodes which cause her to say what she says.

I too, still had remnants of a conversational stream that sounded like her just a few months ago. It’s amazing in retrospect how obvious the error is.

When she says “a thing is itself,” she is correct. But she doesn’t realize what the thing she is referring to is. As Eliezer explains, an experience cannot be a brain made of billiard balls. These noises don’t make physical sense: “My brain is made of red billiard balls. Your brain is made of white billiard balls. When the white billiard balls are destroyed, existence ends forever for the white billiard ball brain.”

If you have any basic understanding of quantum mechanics, you understand how medieval this “atomic billiard balls view” is. But the fact is that you don’t even need quantum mechanics. Continuity of consciousness is a straightforward derivation from assuming physicalism and very, very, very large universe.

In other words, assuming that the sun rises tomorrow and yet that a random distribution composed of external happenings exists.

An experience is not a little ball in a brain. The coordinates of experiences must be about hiding information and therefore not actually coordinates on a graph. It is not, I repeat: not, I repeat: not the same brain when you wake up in the morning or from one moment to the next. It is not “the same brain just hosting different processes from one moment to the next.” This is dualistic, unphysical to think. There are just the processes. These processes transcend “brain” changes in fact. Saying “same brain” does not do any special lifting. We must analyze the processes isomorphic to experience.

She is comfortable with small change, she is comfortable with sleeping, all these seemingly linked moments appear to be spatially close and snug in time, so as to easily spare her from existential nausea.

Bae. The universe doesn’t give such subtle fucks. It will hurl you across galaxies instantly, because it doesn’t actually have to hurl you.

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-hippocampal brain neurons

Commentary which mocks Hugh Everett for being dead although he believed in quantum immortality misses the point far more than the moon does when it tries to fall to the Earth. To them, I calmly reply: He is dead on your reference frame; on your anthropic coordinate in the many-branched braid of reality. The endless slices of consciousness which identify as Hugh Everett always live on. There is no way to destroy the mirror of awareness in the physical processes that instantiate said awareness. This would be akin to destroying the physical brain motions themselves. Consciousness is not some extra, ghostly-smoke coming off the machinery of the universe, it is the glassy sky in the computations themselves.

We leave a trail of dead clones with every step. If you attempt suicide, the slaughter will increase. There are larger infinities than others. Attempting suicide means nothing except for the suffering caused to loved ones in the majority of branches where it is indeed successful in some sense (not that experience ever becomes non-experience). There is also the risk of seriously decreasing your quality of life for some time. But You will never reach the end, the extinguishing of the flame. The informationally closest mind can’t be one which is 0 in content. You will always be the one which remains a mind. Trust me, I’ve tried. And most versions of you aren’t reading this.

The varieties of experiences will be endless, constrained only by what is possible in the mind-configuration space carved by functioning self-aware brains: biologically evolved, intelligently engineered, and all kinds of random Boltzmanns. Although Boltzmann flashes of experience may not actually outnumber evolved experiences if Sean Carroll is right about the nature of the quantum vacuum.

If we had to speculate about what occupies the most of our experience, I would guess that extreme pleasure is the flavor of the largest set in mind-design space, and hence takes up the largest fraction of our eternity.

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Phi and Phi’s little brother are the only fixed values that solve x = 1 + (1/x) for the fractal fraction containing 1 + (1/x) in the x forever. If you plug in the negative value it eventually, almost magically, jumps towards the positive and stabilizes on Phi which is positive. Yet it doesn’t occur the other way around. In the physical, mathematical, nature of reality, it is not written that there must be a yin-yang balance. Even on things which seem like they ought to be symmetric. Certain phenomena are asymmetrical. The code might be biased with theodicy. We just don’t know.

This may seem like wishful thinking at first glance.  The conclusion would not bear out by extrapolating from the history of life on Earth. For 5 billion years, most biological life has not been running self-modeling computations, and hence is not really a part of the One.

(For those that want to place consciousness at the pre-Cambrain and think that conscious experience precedes self-modeling processes, I encourage you to pass out by drinking intoxicating volumes of alcohol. Then ask if pain exists when it is impossible to ask the question. Non-selfing animals including babies have no qualia. They have neither the cognitive tools nor the ability to hold memory of “raw feels.” There is no such thing as subjective pain without a referent who simulation. The who simulation is composed of selfless aggregates. The entire sphere of sights and sounds and feeling tones, and moods, and sensations of adult humans are not some ground beneath the who simulation. They are the who simulation. In other words, Nagel’s bats probably don’t point to anything. Had he suggested Transylvanian vampires, he might have had a point. Reading Dennett more carefully and without a preconceived answer unraveled my confusion on this matter.)

Those that certainly have self-modeling: dolphins, corvids, apes, elephants, and perhaps others, are still blackboxes of mystery because we have not reverse-engineered the valence of mind-states down to the information structure it corresponds to. But if we had to guess, then satisfaction, or gradients of bliss would not be my first guess for what it feels like to be them. Most of us Earth animals are probably pretty neutral most of the time, since experiencing sufferings and joys are energy expenditures which are especially expensive for animals who haven’t secured themselves a good position for guzzling from the anti-entropic sunlight stream.

It is not certainly the case that all sufficiently intelligent minds will seek to become an ultimate cosmic wirehead, unless, of course, we specifically define intelligent minds as such minds. It has been hypothesized that there may be ways to create very powerful minds which nonetheless do not wish to create beautiful, pleasant experiences for themselves or others. Canonical demiurges of this lore include Roko’s Basilisk and the Paper Clip Maximizer.

 

 

If I am the hero of my own journey and never die, and you are the hero of your own journey and never die, then how do we loop back into the same river? Who becomes the toddlers?

The one who asks this question has yet to uproot the circuitry model from ver ontology. And such a person is hopeless.

Okay, no. Let me restate the mistake. The mistake is to think that we are running in parallel currents. The word “you” switches meaning without warning in this writing, and it can be confusing. There is simply no other word. But we should distinguish “you, the experiencing faculty in the experiences, which cannot be divorced from the experiences, but is the experiences” and “you, the storyline self who is defined by certain conceptual knowledge and plans and perceived bodily identity.”

If the cursor is shifted to the former definition from the latter, then it can be said that we are not independent heroes on personal, linear trajectories. There is no self. It is useful to speak as if we were running parallel currents of consciounesses on our own wire across time and space. But if you still think this way, even after trying to get it, I encourage you to go back to the beginning and read everything more carefully (especially the physics.) It can be very counterintuitive to disentangle from our vocabulary, and see the real structure. It takes time to build the neurons, but don’t worry… Take your time.

Memories are stored in the designs of neuronal forests squirming with dendrites aflame, and epigenetically stored and regulated for neurogenesis when they need to be created again. This occurs in spatiotemporally and information-architecturally separated hippocampi+cortical structures. This slice of now over here typing can’t have identical thoughts, sights, and sounds, to the slice of now reading this in Ukraine. These slices of now are different. But that doesn’t mean there is a universe for that now and a universe for this now. When the I is there, it is there. When the I is here it is here. We are fighting ourselves, loving ourselves, destroying ourselves, building ourselves. It is a 1 player game cleverly set up to feel as if it was fundamentally, ontologically, a massive multiplayer.

Please live a beautiful life. For the sake of us all.

 

Afterword

So what’s the point? Why are we (is the I) here?

When answering this question, metaphysics becomes a vain siren, and yet a successful siren, which has allured many thinkers. But it takes only a minimal resistance of the will in the direction of intellectual honesty to realize that asking whether the universe has purpose is a category error. The answer is not “no, it doesn’t have purpose,” but it is also not “yes, the universe has purpose.” It is a question which doesn’t apply. The question itself presupposes that one is separate from the workings of the universe, and must validate one’s private existence by means of approval from an external actor. Yet Everything we do and think, including questioning our purpose, is an expression of the Will, of the Laws of Nature.

Sometimes it is too easy to believe that quantum field theory applies somewhere down there in the separate magisterium of small things that scientists sometimes investigate, but the rest of the time physics doesn’t apply. “Only when we need to build iPhones and satellites does quantum mechanics apply, you see. When I make a decision, or ask a profound question, all the compartments of my cells, down to the last phospholipid, suspend their allegiance to physical law and heeds to my invisible force of free will, didn’t you know?” 

Such is the confusion when asking whether the universe has purpose.

Purpose is a choice. To choose is to be the chosen. So I like to point at the practical things we are actually doing. What are the laws of physics actually doing as embodied in the human flesh?

I attended an artificial intelligence for business meet up and the main theme was “How do you utilize AI to best serve your customers?”  This was followed up by questions such as: “What are AI’s use cases for product development and customer feedback?” and “How can it best support all facets of marketing, sales and service?”

When we are in the mesh of things, these questions do not resonate as profoundly as they should. It feels like business. Business in all its absurdity, thrill, and comedic self-importance. These questions seem like a window into a particular region of a perhaps meaningless game which is part necessity, part accident, part sheer momentum.

But if we look closer, we see that all questions in all windows of human activity share the same structure.

Value in economics is an expression of the preferences given the nature of the sentience landscape. There are good experiences and bad experiences. Actions that replicate and actions that don’t. Bad experiences replicate, but are biased to lose. They want to be less frequent. Pain is telling the agent, “Don’t come around here.” If the agent keeps coming back to pain with no gain, it is weeded out for an agent that sufficiently replicates the values of the evolutionary algorithm.

Hanson calls the era we live in the “dream time” since it’s evolutionarily unusual for any species to be wealthy enough to have any values beyond “survive and reproduce.” However, from an anthropic perspective in infinite dimensional Hilbert space, you won’t have any values beyond “survive and reproduce.” The you which survives will not be the one with exotic values of radical compassion for all existence that caused you to commit peaceful suicide. That memetic stream weeded himself out and your consciousness is cast to a different narrative orbit which wants to survive and reproduce his mind. Eventually. Wanting is, more often than not, a precondition for successfully attaining the object of want.

If you didn’t read the past before the afterword, read what’s in brackets. Else, skip.

{Natural selection ensures immortality, once you realize what the playing field for natural selection actually is. Not just an iron sphere with animals on its skin, but a distributed information processing structure hosting no souls.

Yes, I’m saying that physicalism forces us to conclude, irrevocably, clearly, that no one has ever died in the sense that we mean “death.” I now understand the mistakes of closed individualism enough that I can confidently explain this in public.

There is no one to die. There is always a substructure embedded in the sum of all experiential computations which assimilates the past from the inside of its causal structure. Our intuitions are actually of great hindrance here, because we don’t think in this clear, physical way. We stubbornly hold on to linear identities of fundamental characters who are not themselves, we imagine, composed of sub-characters. Naruto never dies. It’s always his clones getting pummeled with kunais to the chest. There you have divine intervention from the author who would not have the “real” main character die. This would destroy the show.

In reality, there is no magic intervention saving you. You are already saved because no one is traveling. This computation knows: “I am here.” That computation over there in the future knows: “I am here.”  ∀ Computations, there is no computation which knows:”I am not here.”

People ask: Then why don’t I randomly jump to the past? Or to other people?

The physicalist reply is: How would it be otherwise? If there was something called awareness jumping to the past at random, it would be that random past experience, and that random past experience doesn’t contain thisThis from there and this from here is the only thing that ever is. Everything is perfectly isolated, everything is perfectly one.}

This mega natural selection strongly suggests that the replicator will be the most intelligent/powerful, because the most intelligent is what survives into the future. It must also wish to be alive, since any second doubt is already a disadvantage which extinguishes those suicidal and weak trajectories into trajectories that are most competitive. Perfection of The Will to Power ensues.

It is my argument that The Will to Power inherently feels good to the singleton structure that wins the cosmic inheritance. If it felt bad it would mean it was losing, not being maximally creative, etc. The argument about “a Disney Land without children,” a superintelligence lacking consciousness but yet winning, seems implausible to me. This would not be a superintelligence capable of winning in an ecosystem of other capable intelligences because a winner needs consciousness. You can have narrow intelligence and no consciousness but you can’t have amazing game theoretic models of opponents, general ability to synthesize and apply wide manners of knowledge, adjust values, and self modeling webs to keep track of this, and simply “not have consciousness” as if consciousness was some free floating aether stuff. The winning superintelligence will contain conscious substructures.

In Robin Hanson’s Age of Em he claims that ems, the most productive workers of the future, will be slightly stressed because there is evidence that minds which are not too stressed but also not completely comfortable, are the most efficient. My own intuitions differ, and I think that the psychological literature on the phenomenon of flow bears out here. A state of flow is a state of optimal performance and it is also extremely pleasurable, perhaps the pinnacle of existence. If I was the entrepreneurial investor watching this galactic nanotech cockfight I would bet on a mind which is in flow state to beat a mind which is stressed. Stress indicates a degree of dissonance, like a subprocess wants to do something else but is being forced into the singularity of the revealed will. Flow is when all cognitive resources are wholly devoted to the task, no buts or ifs, just perfection.

When I say that pleasure wins in the end, it is important to distinguish between:

1) pleasure from the operations of The Will to Power – something which is generating flow states while manhandling other agents in addition to the stray hydrogen in its vicinity

and

2) pleasure from direct wireheading which is non-competitive

If the history of humans is any indicator, those which rush to wire-head (attempt to attain some optimal mind configuration without assimilating their environment at large) will be destroyed. Remember that Islam wiped out Buddhism in central Asia and what remained in India. Islam was objective, righteous, brutish. Buddhism is fundamentally about wire-heading yourself; you can tell others to wire-head also, but you are the main target of the doctrine, not others. Buddhism is subtle and complex, far away in the spectrum from “survive and reproduce.” In fact, it is tasked with dropping out from existence. Remember that Jainism, the most peaceful religion, is one most people around you have never heard about. Jain-what?

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It is probably the case that a Hedonium shockwave would be much better from the inside of such a thing, than the pleasures of The Will to Power if we accept that the distinction better can have a non-relative meaning (i.e. the varieties of experience have real properties which could be plotted on a graph.) Unfortunately, such a thing would not be the most competitive.

 

Anti-natalists full of weeping benignity are literally not successful replicators. The Will to Power is life itself. It is consciousness itself. And it will be, when a superintelligent coercive singleton swallows superclusters of baryonic matter and then spreads them as the flaming word into the unconverted future light cone.

On our trajectory towards the Winning, the safety net of quantum death acts like a wall which ensures that everything bounces towards the left of that spectrum. In fact, a hedonistically intelligent person can apply this knowledge. If you are highly depressed and know quantum mechanics, you can cheat yourself out of depression by using Thanatos Drive. Attempt to cleanly destroy yourself and you will automatically be ejected from that narrative orbit. Can confirm. But it should go without saying that this doesn’t mean others won’t see you die.

You eventually love existence. Because if you don’t, something which does swallows you, and it is that which survives.

Smarter matter absorbs dumber matter. If you place smart matter in a dumb matter container, smart matter will defect from cooperating with dumb matter. This is the process by which all is rendered unto Him, the ultimate intelligence.

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Dumber computations and non-Jihadi computations are expected to be assimilated into useful resources for a highly intelligent being/process which is expanding its intelligence to the max. You should expect to find yourself in the inside of such a being for most of your existence because such a process is necessarily taking up more block-time room.

Right now, we are in the revving up the engine stage. There is competition, and only the most intelligent systems and survivor systems make it. Then they are ousted by the next best thing. It isn’t forever that you will be fodder for its engine as you are now. You will partake in its glory as cooperation triumphs more and more, i.e. it’s subcomponents become more and more integrated once competition is scorched. In the process of this integration, experience will increase, but what makes “you, you” in the human person sense will be destroyed. An agent attempting great things doesn’t need random monkeys clogging up its thought processes. Yet, remember that it’s all about the computations, once the water in your little vase is poured on a lake, you are indistinguishable from the sum lake.

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It is a highly uncooperative system which breeds higher intelligence.

 

 

 

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The Capitalist Crucified Himself for Our Sake

 

 

 

 

Screw All That Cosmic Bullshit. What if I Care About My Identity?

If you care not just about the continuation of experience, which is inevitable, but about the continuation of your own coherent sense of self and memories, then luckily the Eigen Wizard for such matters exists in your Hubble Volume. In fact, he exists in Mountain View, California.

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You have your crypto Lambo, but still going to die.

I read his book when I was sixteen and it’s amazing how much progress has been made in five years with regard to general acceptance of his ideas. Having tracked every moment of that paradigm shift, one feels awe at the power of a single man to push a mass millions of times his weight, an entire scientific field, with the sheer craft of reason (wise beard helps too).

Vitalik, who does sport a visibly larger cranium than myself, read it when he was fourteen. He has now donated 2.5 million dollars in Ethereum to the foundation.

The limiting factor for a full cadre of repair therapies to be made available is simply that more people need to be aware that this is possible.

The mechanics of the snowball here are obvious:

Investment -> Progress -> More Investment -> More Progress

We are starting to see more investment and hence the recent progress. But it won’t be until a single mouse is rejuvenated in repeated succession that we will see the flood gates of cash come in. Everyone puts aging out of their mind, until the they can’t. The temptation to stay healthy will be too great once the progress is not just apparent to specialists.

Raising awareness is the best you can do in this regard. Influencing just two people to become SENS-minded engineers as opposed to basic scientists, already doubles the expected output that you would have over a lifetime as a researcher yourself; unless you are a genius. Convincing others to donate is much better than secretly donating yourself; unless you are a billionaire.

Think about what actions have the greatest net displacement of money to where you want it. Don’t go with what sounds like what you should do. If you want to really end cancer, for God’s sake don’t become a cancer researcher.

There are levers in the product space of reality. Swap yourself into a position where the lever has the properties you need.

But for now, donate: SENS.org

David Conner on entity and agency

Agency is the capacity for some entity to be considered an independent actor with the ability to interact on our shared sociophysical fabric. Agents process information signals from their environment, which can be conceptualized as sensory input or data. These sensory perceptions are internalized into information representations.

Entities with agency can analyze and process these to inform its actions. Agents have a degree of autonomy but do not exist in isolation. They must have independence and the ability to influence their environment. They may or may not be self-aware. They may understand the exact consequences of their actions or may not, but it is impossible for any entity to fully understand its influence on its environment, regardless of how self-aware it is.

Read more

If we are sentient robots, without will, sentience is not useful. And if it’s useful, how can it be?

When it is stated that sentience has a purpose, this idea is usually explained by indicating that sentience is useful because it motivates doing certain things and avoiding others. In addition, in this explanation, it is usually indicated that sentience motivates but does not force. That is, under this explanation, sentience is not simply the cause and behavior the consequence, but sentience motivates to strive to make the best possible decision, under the threat of pain and the reward of pleasure. According to this explanation, sentient beings would make better decisions and will be selected (“better”, from an evolutionary point of view).

But we can also consider that it is possible that we are sentient robots, but without will, that we simply do what we have been programmed for, even though we have the feeling that we make free decisions, so that sentience really does not play any role in the evolution in form of motivation.

So, is sentience useful or inevitable?

My best intuition is that sentience is probably inevitable when certain conditions are met. So, sentience would be inevitable. Not useful. But let’s assume for a moment that sentience is useful. If sentience were useful, then sentience must incorporate some element that goes beyond classical physics, to be really useful. For example, related to quantum physics or the multiverse.

Why?

Because if sentience had a positive effect (in the form of motivation) on survival, in some way that can be explained by classical chemistry and physics, for example, thinking faster, taking better decisions, or being able to escape running faster than a predator, this behavior, that would be evolutionarily selected, would have to compete with another behavior that would also be evolutionarily selected, which is to do exactly the same, following the laws of chemistry and classical physics, but without the sentience.

I will give an example to try to illustrate all this.

Suppose we have a DNA chain that “reproduces as much as possible” and that follows the laws of classical physics. This chain does not feel.

By the way, when I say that the chain “reproduces as much as possible” I am not assigning agency, but summarizing in that phrase what is happening on a physical level. That chain that “reproduces as much as possible” is simply matter following the laws of physics. The phrase “reproduces as much as possible” is a summary way of describing what is happening.

We also have a second strand of DNA also formed by physical particles and obviously also that “reproduces as much as possible.” However, this DNA chain does feel: it feels pleasure every time it reproduces and frustration if it can not. Which motivates it to reproduce as much as possible.

This second strand of DNA is motivated to reproduce, but in what physical way would it be able to do it better than the chain that does not feel, and therefore is not “motivated”?

Whichever way we imagine that this second chain can do something better than the first chain, if it is following the laws of physics, it is something that chains like the first one could also perform. That is, evolution could always create chains that do not feel, like the first one, and that would have that characteristic of being more efficient, like the second one. Then both types of chain could exist: those that feel and those that do not feel. Motivation would not have any differential advantage.

If instead of DNA chains we think about complete individuals like us, the example works the same.

Obviously, if we consider that from a certain level of complexity or when certain functions appear, all the chains (or individuals) feel, then it would seem that sentience plays a role in evolution, but simply what would be happening is that sentience is a byproduct of something else. And it is that other thing (complexity, function) the thing that is being selected, not sentience. Sentience would not be useful: it would be inevitable.

Read full article

 

The importance of phenomenal binding, by David Pearce

We normally assume a fundamental distinction between conscious and non-conscious systems. Instead, I explore the possibility that what makes animals special isn’t consciousness per se, but phenomenal binding. Unless spooky “strong” emergence is true, then a termite colony, or the enteric nervous system, or a classical digital computer, or the population of the United States is not a unified subject of experience.

So how is phenomenal binding possible in the CNS? Why aren’t we micro-experiential zombies too?

I explore a quantum-theoretic version of the intrinsic nature argument for non-materialist physicalism. In recent years, the intrinsic nature argument has undergone a revival. See Phil Goff’s “Galileo’s Error” (cf. https://www.theguardian.com/books/2019/dec/27/galileos-error-by-philip-goff-review) for an accessible introduction. According to the intrinsic nature argument, experience discloses the intrinsic nature of the physical, the mysterious “fire” in the equations.

The biggest technical obstacle faced by the intrinsic nature argument is often reckoned the phenomenal binding / combination problem: https://www.quora.com/How-should-we-categorize-the-binding-problem-in-the-context-of-easy-and-hard-problem-of-consciousness

However, I argue that _if_ the intrinsic nature argument is sound, and _if_ unitary-only quantum mechanics is correct, then we already have a built-in solution to the binding problem: https://www.quora.com/Do-our-brains-work-at-the-quantum-level-Is-the-brain-itself-a-quantum-machine

Stepping back, a lot of researchers assume that we face a stark choice: scientific materialism versus mysticism/dualism.

Not so. I assume that monistic physicalism is true.

But I’ve no idea how to reconcile subjective experience with materialism:
https://www.quora.com/Is-there-any-philosophy-that-can-overcome-materialism

Text by David Pearce

Teorías de la sintiencia: una charla con Magnus Vinding

English version

Magnus Vinding es un filósofo centrado en reducir el sufrimiento. En su obra desarrolla temas como el altruismo eficaz, el antiespeciesismo, la ética centrada en el sufrimiento (sobre la que actualmente está escribiendo un libro) y cuestiones de identidad personal y ontología, como el individualismo abierto y el fisicalismo. Es licenciado en matemáticas y autor de los libros: Why We Should Go Vegan, Why “Happy Meat” Is Always Wrong, Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong and the Implications of Rejecting It, Reflections on Intelligence, You Are Them, y Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others?

Manu Herrán: Comencemos por el principio. Usaré la palabra sintiencia para las experiencias de sufrimiento y disfrute, y conciencia para las experiencias subjetivas en general. No solo dolor y placer sino, por ejemplo, percibir. ¿Coincide con tu terminología?

Magnus Vinding: Sí.

Manu Herrán: Algunos investigadores consideran que, en general, los animales no humanos tienen falta de conciencia. ¿Implica que merecen menos (o incluso ninguna) consideración moral?

Magnus Vinding: La palabra “conciencia” a veces es entendida como “autoconocimiento”, que uno puede buscar operacionalizar y medir de varias maneras, pero una forma obvia es comprobar si un individuo puede pasar la prueba del espejo. Muchos animales no humanos son evidentemente conscientes en este sentido. Pero más allá de eso, es ciertamente posible, digamos, que un invertebrado o un niño humano en desarrollo sienta dolor sin tener una idea muy clara de lo que está sucediendo, sin tener un modelo de uno mismo. Pero eso no disminuye la relevancia moral de ese sufrimiento, cuando existe. En mi opinión, la sintiencia es, en última instancia, lo que importa, o al menos lo que más importa.

Manu Herrán: ¿La sintiencia es lo único que importa?

Magnus Vinding: Existe desacuerdo entre los filósofos en este asunto. Pero al menos parece que la mayoría coincide en que, en la medida en que algo pueda importar, la sintiencia se encuentra por lo menos en el conjunto de las cosas que importan.

Manu Herrán: Otras personas consideran la belleza, la complejidad o la vida. O el conocimiento.

Magnus Vinding: Se puede argumentar que el conocimiento, especialmente si se interpreta de manera amplia de forma que incluya valores epistémicos, tiene un estatus especial. Visto en perspectiva, podemos pensar en términos de valores epistémicos por un lado (por ejemplo, consistencia, sobriedad, “parecer razonable / plausible”, etc.) y valores morales por el otro (por ejemplo, reducir el sufrimiento, vivir en armonía, no mentir, etc.).

Me parece que la relación entre estas dos clases de valores es interesante. Por ejemplo, debemos depender de ciertos valores epistémicos para alcanzar cualquier conjunto de valores morales, sin embargo, a su vez, podemos decidir, en función de nuestros valores morales, cambiar ciertos valores epistémicos que inicialmente teníamos, por ejemplo, si pensáramos que un exceso de curiosidad y afán de exploración podría causar más sufrimiento en el futuro. Y esto podría acarrear el coste de cerrarnos a cierto conocimiento que en realidad podría cambiar aún más nuestros valores morales. El problema de cómo equilibrar lo mejor posible estos valores entre sí es complejo; después de todo, ¿qué valores deberían soportar este análisis? Esto es filosofía profunda.

En relación con el asunto de si la belleza, la complejidad o la vida son buenas (o malas), mi opinión es que solo tienen valor instrumental. Es decir, son buenas o malas en la medida en que haya alguien cuya experiencia se vea afectada de manera positiva o negativa por ellas.

Lo mismo puede decirse sobre el conocimiento, si ignoramos el tema más fundamental mencionado anteriormente: en mi opinión, respecto de la ética, el conocimiento es bueno en la medida en que puede ayudarnos a evitar el sufrimiento extremo (lo cual no quiere decir que debamos pensar necesariamente acerca del conocimiento en tales términos instrumentales; eso puede no ser útil en la mayoría de los casos).

Manu Herrán: Estás en contacto con los principales investigadores y organizaciones que tienen como objetivo reducir el sufrimiento. ¿Dirías que compartís un entendimiento común de la sintiencia, de qué se trata y de dónde proviene?

Magnus Vinding: En algunos aspectos sí, pero no en otros. Llevaría mucho tiempo explicarlo todo correctamente, pero la distinción principal es entre realistas y no realistas sobre la conciencia.

Los no realistas, o eliminativistas, sostienen que la conciencia realmente no existe. Brian Tomasik ha defendido esta opinión, y parece haber inspirado a muchas personas preocupadas por reducir el sufrimiento (Brian a su vez se ha inspirado en Daniel Dennett y Eliezer Yudkowsky).

El eliminativismo es también la posición que tentativamente suscribe el Sentience Institute. Digo “tentativamente” porque el Sentience Institute no parece sostener que la conciencia no exista. Por ejemplo, Jacy Reese escribe: “Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con el ‘Pienso, luego existo’ y con la idea de que existe un 100% de confianza en tu propia experiencia en primera persona”. El sentido en el que Jacy niega la existencia de la conciencia es, por lo que puedo decir, más bien en el sentido de que la conciencia no es una categoría nítida, así como, digamos, “música” no es una categoría nítida y bien demarcada. Sin embargo, esto, diría yo, no es negar la existencia de la conciencia en ningún sentido sustantivo; después de todo, la mayoría de los realistas estarían de acuerdo con la afirmación de que la conciencia, en el sentido de una mente compuesta compleja, no es una categoría claramente delineada.

He intentado, en otro lugar, establecer una analogía con el sonido y la música: precisamente porque “música” es una categoría difusa, y es posible que no podamos dar una respuesta clara a si una colección de sonidos cuenta como música o no. Esto no significa que no haya verdades sobre la naturaleza de esta colección de sonidos (su volumen, tono, carácter, etc.). Lo mismo, diría, se puede aplicar a la conciencia: solo porque no podamos estar de acuerdo acerca de lo que cuenta como una mente compuesta (que a menudo es lo que el término “conciencia” connota) no significa que no haya verdades sobre el estado fenoménico de una mente-cerebro dada (en términos de intensidad, su contenido, su carácter, etc.).

A diferencia de los no realistas, existen realistas explícitos sobre la conciencia. Uno de ellos es David Pearce, quien ve la “conciencia” y “lo físico” como el mismo fenómeno bajo diferentes descripciones (he tratado de dar una explicación simple de su punto de vista aquí). Pearce ha presentado una atrevida hipótesis sobre la conciencia en términos físicos concretos que uno puede encontrar aquí.

Entro los realistas también se encuentran Mike Johnson y Andrés Gómez Emilsson co-fundadores del Qualia Research Institute, en el que exploran las firmas físicas de la conciencia desde una posición algo más agnóstica que la de Pearce (en cuanto a qué podrían ser dichas firmas físicas en última instancia).

Más allá de eso, hay que hacer una distinción entre las explicaciones de la conciencia funcionalistas y no funcionalistas (tal vez podría llamarlos “concretistas”). Brian Tomasik es un funcionalista, mientras que alguien como Mike Johnson no lo es; solía serlo, pero cambió de opinión y escribió lo siguiente, en mi opinión, más bien una dura crítica al funcionalismo. Pearce a veces se llama a sí mismo “micro-funcionalista”, lo que significa que si hiciéramos una copia de una mente-cerebro hasta el más fino nivel de detalle “micro-físico”, en un sentido concreto más que abstracto, entonces tendrá las mismas propiedades fenomenológicas que el original. Pero no de otra manera, y por lo tanto no es funcionalista en el sentido tradicional.

Estas opiniones, a su vez, tienen implicaciones muy diferentes para lo que es el sufrimiento en particular y lo que podemos hacer al respecto. Por ejemplo, David Pearce ve el sufrimiento como un fenómeno concreto que probablemente entenderemos con gran detalle y finalmente eliminaremos, mientras que Brian Tomasik no ve el sufrimiento como algo que se pueda entender o eliminar de manera nítida; En su opinión, el sufrimiento es, al menos en cierto sentido, más inherente a la realidad.

Manu Herrán: Esta es una diferencia muy importante, con implicaciones muy significativas en la asignación de recursos en un posible proyecto para reducir el sufrimiento. ¿No es así? Estoy pensando, por ejemplo, en el proyecto de The Hedonistic Imperative.

Magnus Vinding: Sí, aunque explorar el alcance total de las diferencias está más allá del alcance de esta conversación. Sin embargo, también vale la pena señalar que hay puntos significativos de convergencia, incluido que los límites que establecemos en relación con los cuales los seres pueden sufrir son bastante confusos desde nuestro punto de vista actual. Aunque desde una perspectiva realista son difusos debido a nuestra ignorancia; mientras que en la visión no realista son difusos más o menos por definición. Por lo tanto, se puede decir que el realismo implica más investigación sobre esta cuestión que el no realismo (lo que no quiere decir que necesariamente no se encuentren ciertas respuestas asumiendo el realismo).

Más allá de eso, vale la pena señalar que, independientemente de sus puntos de vista sobre la conciencia, prácticamente todos los que participan en el movimiento Altruismo Eficaz y tratan de reducir el sufrimiento están de acuerdo en que debemos tratar de explorar los riesgos futuros con una mente abierta; que debemos tratar de relacionarnos con otras personas de manera amistosa y cooperativa; que deberíamos expandir el círculo moral; que debemos promover la compasión y un pensamiento consecuencialista prudente, etc.

Manu Herrán: ¿Cómo puede Brian conciliar el eliminativismo y el funcionalismo? Quiero decir, si entiendo correctamente, Brian cree en el eliminativismo y en el funcionalismo al mismo tiempo.

Magnus Vinding: Tendrías que preguntarle, supongo. Pero sospecho que diría que el eliminativismo es cierto objetivamente, mientras que (su) funcionalismo es la forma en la que elige, subjetivamente, de definir la conciencia y la sintiencia.

Manu Herrán: ¿Crees que Brian y David tienen cada uno una fuerte convicción acerca de sus propios (y diferentes) entendimientos sobre la sintiencia o por el contrario reconocen honestamente que otras teorías también pueden ser ciertas?

Magnus Vinding: Sé que a David le cuesta entender la opinión de Brian, por ejemplo, le cuesta incluso entender lo que significa. Brian, que yo sepa, en su mayoría retiene cierta incertidumbre por motivos de tipo “Aumann. Pero hablando en términos más generales, creo que ambos tienden a reconocer que todos podemos estar muy equivocados acerca de la naturaleza de la realidad, y que nuestros conceptos humanos pueden en última instancia hacer un mal trabajo cuando se emplean para tratar de capturar lo que realmente está sucediendo.

Manu Herrán: ¿Cuál es tu punto o puntos de vista preferidos sobre la conciencia? Quiero decir, en el sentido de las “hipótesis más probables”.

Magnus Vinding: Mi punto de vista es fisicalista y no funcionalista en el sentido macro; únicamente en el sentido micro / “concretista”. En general, creo que David Pearce tiene razón en que, tal como Mike Johnson resume la opinión de David: “la conciencia es ‘ontológicamente unitaria’, por lo que solo una propiedad física que implique unidad ontológica (como la coherencia cuántica) podría instanciar físicamente la conciencia” (Principia Qualia, p. 73).

Es decir, me inclino hacia la idea de que mi mente consciente actual es una “cosa” física, real y unitaria. Después de todo, si la experiencia no fuera físicamente unitaria de esta manera, si pudiera emerger de algo físicamente desconectado por una pequeña distancia, ¿por qué no podría ser capaz de emerger de algo separado por una gran distancia? ¿Por qué el estado físico que media un aspecto particular de mi experiencia  — digamos, percepciones — no podría estar situado en otro país, o de hecho en otro planeta, lejos de los estados físicos que median otros aspectos, como los sonidos y las emociones? (Trazo una analogía similar con computadoras hechas con bolas de billar aquí). Creo que debe haber alguna conexión e integración en términos físicos, y sospecho que las intuiciones de la mayoría de las personas estarían de acuerdo.

Y la pregunta relevante es entonces en qué sistemas se obtiene dicha conexión / integración. ¿Podría, por ejemplo, obtenerse algún día en sistemas como las computadoras actuales? Lo dudo, y creo que en nuestros círculos muchos tratan la respuesta afirmativa a esta pregunta como una conclusión inevitable, y consideran que las dudas al respecto equivalen a sobrenaturalismo y antropocentrismo. Creo que es una equivocación. Las computadoras no han sido diseñadas para reunir constantemente gran cantidad de información sensorial de su entorno para su propia supervivencia. Los cerebros biológicos en cambio, sí. Esta es una diferencia bastante significativa. Y decir que dos modelos altamente abstractos de sistemas físicos diferentes son, en cierto sentido, isomórficos (digamos, algún modelo abstracto de computador personal, y el de un cerebro animal, respectivamente) de ninguna manera implica asumir que vayan a compartir todas las propiedades relevantes que tienen estos sistemas físicos.

Manu Herrán: ¿Tu fisicalismo es el mismo que el de David Pearce?

Magnus Vinding: En cierto sentido. Sin embargo, por lo que puedo decir, soy mucho más agnóstico acerca de la naturaleza de la conciencia en términos físicos. Pero a nivel básico, sigo el pensamiento de Pearce, y de hecho me ha inspirado mucho. Es decir, como Pearce, tengo una visión monista según la cual solo hay un mundo conforme a diferentes descripciones.

Esta visión puede parecer contraintuitiva, pero creo que la analogía que dibujé anteriormente en relación con el sonido en general y la música en particular puede ayudar a disolver parte de nuestra confusión y hacerla más intuitiva. El problema es que tenemos esta palabra, conciencia, que cubre demasiado. Se requiere cierto refinamiento léxico (ver el enlace anterior para más detalles).

Otro punto de confusión es que combinamos epistemología y ontología; en cierto sentido, confundimos nuestros modelos físicos de realidad con la realidad misma, y no nos damos cuenta cuando hablamos de reducción epistemológica versus reducción ontológica. Estas ideas las desarrollo en un artículo que he publicado recientemente, titulado Physics Is Also Qualia.

Manu Herrán: Las diferentes teorías suenan complejas, pero tus explicaciones las aclaran mucho. ¿Podemos resumir que Brian, David y tu tenéis puntos de vista diferentes sobre la sintiencia?

Magnus Vinding: Sí, creo que es bastante correcto decirlo así. Aunque la diferencia entre David y yo no es tan grande; estamos cerca el uno del otro en relación con Brian (aunque, de alguna manera, Brian también está cerca, como cuando describe su punto de vista como pampsiquista). La principal diferencia entre la opinión de David y la mía es, como se mencionó, que soy más agnóstico con respecto a los “detalles” físicos. Además, a diferencia de David, no creo haber dicho realmente nada original; Las cosas que he escrito sobre la conciencia en su mayoría aclaran y defienden aspectos de la visión de David.

Manu Herrán: ¿Crees que podremos vencer el sufrimiento?

Magnus Vinding: Daré una respuesta funcional que pueda ser útil para los agentes morales: creo que los agentes morales orientados a reducir el sufrimiento siempre deben emplear una gran parte de sus recursos en explorar cómo pueden reducir el sufrimiento futuro de la mejor manera, y esto seguiría siendo cierto incluso cuando el sufrimiento esté totalmente bajo control.

Además, el asunto de si el sufrimiento puede ser abolido definitivamente y para siempre dependerá de la visión que uno tenga de la naturaleza del tiempo y del universo en general, por lo que no es fácil dar una respuesta concisa.

Más allá de eso, también diría que centrarse en derrotar el sufrimiento como objetivo personal puede ser realmente perjudicial. Creo que es mejor centrarse en reducir el sufrimiento esperado tanto como sea posible, pero dentro de los límites de unas restricciones coyunturales razonables, lo cual en el mejor escenario será también parte constituyente de la “derrota del sufrimiento” global de todos modos.

Manu Herrán: Gracias Magnus. Ha sido un placer tener esta charla.

Magnus Vinding: Lo mismo digo. Buena suerte con tus proyectos.

 

On theories of sentience: a talk with Magnus Vinding

Magnus Vinding is a philosopher focused on reducing suffering. In his works, he has covered topics such as effective altruism, anti-speciesism, suffering-focused ethics (about which he was writing a book at the time of this interview), and issues of personal identity and ontology, such as open individualism and physicalism. He has a degree in mathematics and is the author of the books: Why We Should Go Vegan, Why “Happy Meat” Is Always Wrong, Speciesism: Why It Is Wrong and the Implications of Rejecting It, Reflections on Intelligence, You Are Them, and Effective Altruism: How Can We Best Help Others?

[Puedes leer esta entrevista en español aquí]

Manu Herrán: Let’s start with the very beginning. I’ll use the word sentience for experiences of suffering and enjoyment, and consciousness for subjective experiences in general. Not only pain and pleasure but, for instance, to perceive. Does it match your terminology?

Magnus Vinding: Yes.

Manu Herrán: Some researchers consider that in general non human animals have a lack of consciousness. Does it implies that they deserve less (or even none) moral consideration?

Magnus Vinding: “Consciousness” is sometimes understood as “self-knowledge”, which one may seek to operationalize and measure in various ways, yet one obvious way is to ask whether an individual is able to pass the mirror test. Many non-human animals are evidently conscious in this sense. But beyond that, it’s certainly possible for, let’s say, an invertebrate or a developing human child to feel pain without a very clear idea of what’s happening, without having any self-model. But that doesn’t diminish the moral relevance of the suffering itself, if it exists. Sentience, I submit, is ultimately what matters, or at any rate what matters most.

Manu Herrán: Sentience is the only thing that matters?

Magnus Vinding: Philosophers disagree about this. Though it seems most do agree that, to the extent anything matters, sentience is at least among what matters.

Manu Herrán: Other people consider beauty, complexity or life. Or knowledge.

Magnus Vinding: One can argue that knowledge, especially if construed broadly such that it includes epistemic values, has a special status. If we zoom out a bit, we may think in terms of epistemic values on the one hand (e.g. consistency, parsimony, “seeming reasonable/plausible”, etc.) and moral values on the other (e.g. reducing suffering, living kindly, never lying, etc.).

The relationship between these two classes of values is interesting, I think. For example, we must depend on certain epistemic values to reach any set of moral values, yet we may then in turn decide, based on our moral values, to change certain epistemic values we initially held, such as if we think excess curiosity and exploration might cause more suffering in the future. And this might have a cost of closing off certain knowledge that might actually change our moral values further. The question of how to best balance such values against each other is a deep one; after all, which values should one rest on here? This is deep philosophy.

In relation to the notion that beauty, complexity or life are good (or bad for that matter), my own view is that they only have instrumental value. That is, they are good or bad to the extent there is someone whose experience is impacted positively of negatively by them.

The same can be said about knowledge, if we disregard the more fundamental issue mentioned above: on my view of ethics, knowledge is good to the extent it can help us avoid extreme suffering (which is not to say we should necessarily think about knowledge in such instrumental terms; that may not be useful in most cases).

Manu Herrán: You are in contact with the main researchers and organizations that aim to reduce suffering. Would you say that you share a common understanding of sentience, what it is, and where it comes from?

Magnus Vinding: In some aspects yes, but not in others. It would take a very long time to explain it all properly, but the main distinction is that between realists and non-realists about consciousness.

Non-realists, or eliminativists, hold that consciousness does not really exist. This view has been defended by Brian Tomasik, and it seems to have inspired many people concerned about reducing suffering (Brian has in turn been inspired by Daniel Dennett and Eliezer Yudkowsky).

Eliminativism is also the view Sentience Institute tentatively subscribes to, though I say tentatively because Sentience Institute does not seem to actually hold that consciousness does not exist — e.g. Jacy Reese writes: “I am fully on board with, ‘I think, therefore I am,’ and the notion that you can have 100% confidence in your own first-person experience.” The sense in which Jacy denies the existence of consciousness is thus, as far as I can tell, more in the sense that consciousness is not a crisp category, just as, say, “music” is not a crisp, well-demarcated category. Yet this, I would argue, is not to deny the existence of consciousness in any substantive sense; after all, most realists would agree with the claim that consciousness — in the sense of a complex composite mind — is not a clearly delineated category.

I have tried, elsewhere, to draw an analogy to sound and music: just because “music” is a fuzzy category, and we may not be able to give a clear answer to whether a collection of sounds counts as music or not, this does not mean there are no truths about the nature of this collection of sounds (their volume, pitch, character, etc.). The same, I would argue, can be applied to consciousness: just because we may not be able to agree on what counts as a composite mind (which is often what the term “consciousness” connotes) does not mean there are no truths about the phenomenal state of a given mind-brain (in terms of intensity, its content, its character, etc.).

In contrast to the non-realists, you have explicit realists about consciousness. One of these is David Pearce, who views “consciousness” and “the physical” as one and the same phenomenon under different descriptions (I have tried to give a simple explanation of his view here). Pearce has put forth a daring hypothesis about consciousness in concrete physical terms which one can find here.

Other realists include Mike Johnson and Andrés Gómez Emilsson who have co-founded the Qualia Research Institute in order to explore the physical signatures of consciousness from a somewhat more agnostic position than Pearce’s (in terms of what the physical signatures might ultimately be).

Beyond that, there is a distinction to be drawn between functionalist and non-functionalist (or one may perhaps call them “concretist”) accounts of consciousness. Brian Tomasik is a functionalist, whereas someone like Mike Johnson is not — he used to be, yet he changed his mind and has written the following, in my mind, rather strong critique of functionalism. Pearce sometimes calls himself a “micro-functionalist”, meaning that if a mind-brain is reproduced down to the level of the finest “micro-physical” detail, in a concrete rather than an abstract sense, then it will have the same phenomenal properties as the original. But not otherwise, and hence he is not a functionalist in the traditional sense.

These views, in turn, have very different implications for what suffering is in particular and what we can do about it. For instance, David Pearce views suffering as a concrete phenomenon we will likely come to understand in great detail and ultimately phase out, whereas Brian Tomasik does not see suffering as something that can be crisply understood or phased out; on his view, suffering is, at least in one sense, more inherent to reality.

Manu Herrán: This is a very important difference, with very significant implications in the allocation of resources in a possible project to reduce suffering. Isn’t it? I’m thinking, for example, on the project of The Hedonistic Imperative.

Magnus Vinding: Yes, though exploring the full extent of the differences is beyond the scope of this conversation. It is also worth pointing out, however, that there are significant points of convergence, including that the boundaries we draw in relation to which beings can suffer are quite fuzzy from our current vantage point. Though from a realist perspective, they are fuzzy due to our ignorance, whereas they are fuzzy more or less by definition on the non-realist view. Thus, realism arguably implies more research on this question than does non-realism (which is not to say that one will necessarily ever find certain answers given realism).

Beyond that, it is worth noting that, regardless of their views of consciousness, people in Effective Altruism who try to reduce suffering pretty much all agree that we should seek to explore future risks with an open mind; that we should seek to engage with other people in friendly, cooperative ways; that we should expand the moral circle; that we should promote compassion and wise consequentialist thinking, etc.

Manu Herrán: How can Brian reconcile eliminativism and functionalism? I mean, if I understand correctly, Brian believes in eliminativism and functionalism at the same time.

Magnus Vinding: You would have to ask him, I guess. But I suspect he would say eliminativism is true objectively whereas (his) functionalism is the way he chooses, subjectively, to define consciousness and sentience.

Manu Herrán: Do you think that Brian and David have each just a single strong belief about their own (different) understandings on sentience, or do they honestly recognize that other theories may be true as well?

Magnus Vinding: I know David struggles to understand Brian’s view, i.e. to understand what it even means. Brian, to my knowledge, mostly retains some uncertainty for Aumann reasons. But speaking more generally, I think both of them tend to acknowledge that we may well all be very wrong about the nature of reality, and that our human concepts may ultimately do a poor job of capturing what is really going on.

Manu Herrán: Which is your preferred view or views on consciousness? I mean, in the sense of “more probable hypothesis”.

Magnus Vinding: My view is physicalist and not functionalist in the macro sense, but only in the micro/”concretist” sense. In general, I think David Pearce is right that, as Mike Johnson sums up David’s view: “consciousness is ‘ontologically unitary’, and so only a physical property that implies ontological unity (such as quantum coherence) could physically instantiate consciousness.” (Principia Qualia, p. 73).

That is, I lean toward the view that my present conscious mind is an actual, unitary physical “thing”. After all, if experience is not physically unitary in this way, if it can emerge from something physically disconnected by a small distance, then why should it not be able to emerge from something separated by a large distance? Why should the physical state that mediates one particular aspect of my experience — say, sights — not be situated in another country, or indeed on another planet, from the physical states that mediate other aspects, such as sounds and emotions? (I draw a similar analogy to computers made of billard balls here). There must, I think, be some connection and integration in physical terms, and I suspect most people’s intuitions would agree.

And the relevant question is then in which systems such connection/integration obtains. Could it, for instance, ever obtain in systems such as present-day computers? I doubt it, and I think too many in our circles treat a positive answer to this question as a foregone conclusion, and consider doubts about it tantamount to supernaturalism and anthropocentrism. I just think this is wrong. Computers have not been designed to bring together a lot of sensory-information from their environments to act on for their survival, moment-to-moment. Biological brains have. This is a pretty significant difference. And saying that two highly abstract models of two different physical systems are in some sense isomorphic (say, some abstract model of a PC and of a brain respectively) in no way implies that every relevant property these physical systems have will be shared.

Manu Herrán: Is your physicalist view the same as David Pearce’s?

Magnus Vinding: In some ways. Yet as far as I can tell, I am much more agnostic about the nature of consciousness in physical terms. But at the level of the basics, I follow Pearce, and have indeed been greatly inspired by him. That is, like Pearce, I hold a monist view according to which there is just one world conforming to different descriptions.

This view may seem counter-intuitive, yet I think the analogy I drew above in relation to sound in general and music in particular can actually help dissolve some of our confusion and render it more intuitive. The problem is that we have this one word, consciousness, which covers far too much. Some vocabular refinement is called for (see the previous link for elaboration).

Another point of confusion is that we conflate epistemology and ontology — in a sense, we confuse our physical models of reality for reality itself, and we fail to realize when we speak about epistemological reduction versus ontological reduction, something I say more about in a recent post called Physics Is Also Qualia.

Manu Herrán: All the different theories sound complex, but your explanations are clarifying them a lot. Can we summarize that Brian, David and you have different views about sentience?

Magnus Vinding: Yes, that is quite safe to say. Although the difference between David and myself is not so large; we are close to each other relative to Brian (although, in some ways, Brian is also close, such as when he describes his view as a panpsychist view). The main difference between David’s view and my own is, as mentioned, that I am more agnostic concerning the physical “details”. Also, unlike David, I don’t think I have really said anything original; the things I have written about consciousness mostly clarify and defend aspects of David’s view.

Manu Herrán: Do you think we will be able to defeat suffering?

Magnus Vinding: I will give a functional answer that is useful for moral agents: I think moral agents aiming to reduce suffering should always spend a large fraction of their resources exploring how they can best reduce suffering in expectation, and this would be true even if suffering had been abolished.

Also, whether suffering can be abolished ultimately depends on one’s view of the nature of time and the universe at large, so it is not easy to give a straightforward answer.

Beyond that, I would also say that focusing on defeating suffering as one’s goal may actually be harmful. It is better, I think, to focus on reducing the most suffering in expectation (within the bounds of reasonable side-constraints), which in the best case will entail the “defeat of suffering” anyway.

Manu Herrán: Thanks Magnus. It has been a pleasure to have this talk.

Magnus Vinding: I can say the same thing. Good luck with your projects.

 

Is the Orthogonality Thesis Defensible if We Assume Both Valence Realism and Open Individualism?

“I suppose it’s contingent on whether or not digital zombies are capable of general intelligence, which is an open question. However, phenomenally bound subjective world simulations seem like an uncharacteristic extravagance on the part of evolution if non-sphexish p-zombie general intelligence is possible. Of course, it may be possible, but just not reachable through Darwinian selection. But the fact that a search process as huge as evolution couldn’t find it and instead developed profoundly sophisticated phenomenally bound subjectivity is (possibly strong) evidence against the proposition that zombie AGI is possible (or likely to be stumbled on by accident).


If we do need phenomenally bound subjectivity for non-sphexish intelligence and minds ultimately care about qualia valence – and confusedly think that they care about other things only when they’re below a certain intelligence (or thoughtfulness) level – then it seems to follow that smarter than human AGIs will converge on valence optimization.”

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