Definitions > Physicalistic idealism
Physicalistic idealism is a particular case of Non-materialist Physicalism.
Physicalistic idealism is the paradigmatic case of Non-materialist Physicalism, and sometimes the terms Physicalistic idealism and Non-materialist Physicalism can be considered synonymous.
There are at least three cases of Physicalistic idealism
Physicalistic idealism claims two things: it claims that reality is fundamentally experiential and also it claims that the natural world is exhaustively described by the equations of physics and their solutions.
Physicalistic idealism uses a dualistic terminology in which it is assumed that there are two types of substance (physics and ideas). In this terminology, experiencies are included in the realm of “ideas”.
Physicalistic idealism is the non-materialist physicalist claim that reality is fundamentally experiential and that the natural world is exhaustively described by the equations of physics and their solutions.
“Physicalism” is sometimes treated as the formalistic claim that the natural world is exhaustively described by the equations of physics and their solutions. Beyond these structural-relational properties of matter and energy, the term “physicalism” is also often used to make an ontological claim about the intrinsic character of whatever the equations describe. This intrinsic character, or metaphysical essence, is typically assumed to be non-phenomenal. “Strawsonian physicalists” (cf. “Consciousness and Its Place in Nature: Does Physicalism Entail Panpsychism?”) and other non-materialist physicalists dispute any such assumption. Traditional reductive physicalism proposes that the properties of larger entities are determined by properties of their physical parts. If the wavefunction monism of post-Everett quantum mechanics assumed here is true, then the world does not contain discrete physical parts as understood by classical physics. If contemporary physicalism is true, reductionism is false.
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